Remove retired chat placeholder and stale deployment documentation

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 123 deletions

diff --git a/docs/CHAT-DESIGN.txt b/docs/CHAT-DESIGN.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index fa2ad1b..0000000
--- a/docs/CHAT-DESIGN.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-Copyright (C) 2026 Doan Luu Duc Tai <doan@luuduct.ai>
-
-This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
-published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
-License, or (at your option) any later version.
-
-This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
-
-You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
-along with this program.  If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-
-
-PRIVATE CHAT DESIGN AND LIMITATIONS
-
-    Status: experimental implementation on feature/private-chat.
-    CHAT-APPLICATION.txt records the implemented formats, behavior, commands,
-    tests, and current limitations. This document preserves the original design.
-    CHAT-PRODUCTION.txt records the later packaged deployment path.
-
-USER EXPERIENCE
-
-    Entry offers CREATE NEW CHAT and OPEN CHAT FILE. Creation asks for a display
-    name and password, generates a dedicated identity locally, and downloads one
-    protected file. The user must reopen that file before sending a first message.
-    Returning users select the file locally and unlock it with its password.
-    Usernames are labels; cryptographic identities determine access.
-
-    Show authenticated total, sent, and received message counts. Let the user
-    select N recent messages, including zero, and page backwards for older ones.
-    Sending never requires an updated identity file. Scope is text only between
-    each visitor and Doan, with no public directory, attachments, or group chats.
-
-    Intended host: https://chat.doan.luuduct.ai/ with API under /api/ on the same
-    origin. It is not configured or deployed yet. The feature branch adds Message
-    Me links below the name in the home-page box and after Services in navigation.
-
-CRYPTOGRAPHY AND FILES
-
-    Fixed encryption: RFC 9980 ML-KEM-1024 + X448 with OpenPGP v6 keys.
-    Test signing profile: ML-DSA-87 + Ed448. Dedicated application identities must
-    remain separate from Doan's canonical RSA identity. Advise users not to reuse
-    chat identities elsewhere; exported keys cannot be technically restricted to
-    this application alone. Future authentication signatures must bind to the
-    application, origin, conversation, operation, fresh nonce, and expiry.
-
-    The intended chat file contains versioned recovery and identity data, server
-    identity, and a pinned owner public-key fingerprint. Its exact protected file
-    format is not finalized. The compatibility probe protects OpenPGP secret-key
-    material; it does not implement the proposed complete chat-file envelope.
-    Private keys and passwords must never be uploaded to the server or placed
-    in a URL, log, analytics event, crash report, or application browser storage.
-
-    Both participants need access to their own stored conversation. The browser
-    signs and encrypts each message for both participants. The plaintext payload
-    binds the conversation, sender, unique message ID, and protocol version.
-    Display names can travel inside encrypted conversation details.
-
-STATE AND LIMITS
-
-    No intentional persistent browser chat state: no cookies, localStorage,
-    sessionStorage, IndexedDB, service workers, analytics, or third-party requests.
-    Keep keys, passwords, session credentials, and loaded history in memory only.
-    Serve chat content with Cache-Control: no-store. Reload, close, and leave
-    require the file and password again. Clear references and zero mutable secret
-    buffers where possible; JavaScript strings and browser/OS copies are not
-    reliably erasable. Test page restoration and back/forward navigation.
-
-    The downloaded identity file is the intentional persistent client artifact.
-    Browsers and operating systems may retain memory, swap, crash dumps, download
-    records, or restored pages. The application cannot promise literally zero
-    traces. The current browser probe checks only its own limited test behavior.
-
-    The VPS necessarily retains ciphertext, public-key associations, message IDs,
-    ordering, counts, and authentication state. Connection addresses, timing, and
-    ciphertext sizes are visible while serving requests. Avoid retaining these
-    in application/access logs. Storage and encrypted backups require consistent
-    database snapshots and a tested recovery procedure before actual chat use.
-
-    The private file is a credential. A lost file/password has no username-based
-    recovery. A copied unlocked identity enables impersonation and historical
-    decryption. Rotation can protect future use but cannot undo historical
-    ciphertext or key copies. Static OpenPGP does not automatically provide
-    forward secrecy. Compromise of a shared owner key can affect every
-    conversation encrypted to that key.
-
-    The browser trusts served code, including WASM and generated JavaScript.
-    A compromised server, dependency, extension, browser, or OS may expose keys
-    or plaintext. A pinned key does not defeat a malicious application update
-    or solve first-visit trust. A separate origin limits ordinary cross-origin
-    access, not shared-host compromise or every cross-site attack.
-
-LIBREJS AND LICENSING
-
-    First-party code is AGPL-3.0-or-later. Third-party licenses and notices remain
-    accurate. Required legal comments are the exception to the no-comments rule.
-    Supply machine-readable JS licensing and corresponding Rust/WASM/JS source.
-    Test actual LibreJS recognition, generated bindings, workers, and WASM before
-    displaying GNU LibreJS-compliant. The compatibility harness makes no such
-    claim and is not a public chat application.
-
-    Intended badge: yellow, GNU LibreJS-compliant, linked to
-    https://www.gnu.org/software/librejs/ . Hover and keyboard focus explain:
-
-        LibreJS compliance concerns software freedom, not a guarantee of privacy
-        or security. Review the source code, dependencies, and scripts delivered
-        to your browser. Server-delivered code can change between visits; free
-        software can still track users or behave maliciously.
-
-REMAINING RELIABILITY WORK
-
-    The OpenSSL compatibility experiment is in CHAT-OPENSSL-MIGRATION.txt.
-    It supersedes the original backend gate, not the remaining application review.
-    Implement and
-    test file creation/import, recovery confirmation, signed one-use challenges,
-    authorization, encrypted sends/replies, replay rejection, N=0 and pagination,
-    authenticated counters, quotas, rate limits, hostile file and packet limits,
-    plaintext-only display, session expiry, explicit lock, reload/restoration,
-    no network leakage, no persistent application storage, and complete backup
-    restoration. No application is ready merely because its crypto test passes.