diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'docs')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/CHAT-DESIGN.txt | 122 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/CHAT-OPENSSL-MIGRATION.txt | 253 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/CHAT-SECURITY-REVIEW.txt | 122 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/POLICY.txt | 10 |
4 files changed, 505 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/docs/CHAT-DESIGN.txt b/docs/CHAT-DESIGN.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7b8849c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/CHAT-DESIGN.txt @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +Copyright (C) 2026 Doan Luu Duc Tai <doan@luuduct.ai> + +This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as +published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the +License, or (at your option) any later version. + +This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +GNU Affero General Public License for more details. + +You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License +along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + + +PRIVATE CHAT DESIGN AND LIMITATIONS + + Status: planned application; only the cryptographic compatibility probe + currently exists. This document is a specification, not a completion claim. + Work remains on feature/private-chat. Nothing is deployed to production. + +USER EXPERIENCE + + Entry offers CREATE NEW CHAT and OPEN CHAT FILE. Creation asks for a display + name and password, generates a dedicated identity locally, and downloads one + protected file. The user must reopen that file before sending a first message. + Returning users select the file locally and unlock it with its password. + Usernames are labels; cryptographic identities determine access. + + Show authenticated total, sent, and received message counts. Let the user + select N recent messages, including zero, and page backwards for older ones. + Sending never requires an updated identity file. Scope is text only between + each visitor and Doan, with no public directory, attachments, or group chats. + + Intended host: https://chat.doan.luuduct.ai/ with API under /api/ on the same + origin. It is not configured or deployed yet. The feature branch adds Message + Me links below the name in the home-page box and after Services in navigation. + +CRYPTOGRAPHY AND FILES + + Fixed encryption: RFC 9980 ML-KEM-1024 + X448 with OpenPGP v6 keys. + Test signing profile: ML-DSA-87 + Ed448. Dedicated application identities must + remain separate from Doan's canonical RSA identity. Advise users not to reuse + chat identities elsewhere; exported keys cannot be technically restricted to + this application alone. Future authentication signatures must bind to the + application, origin, conversation, operation, fresh nonce, and expiry. + + The intended chat file contains versioned recovery and identity data, server + identity, and a pinned owner public-key fingerprint. Its exact protected file + format is not finalized. The compatibility probe protects OpenPGP secret-key + material; it does not implement the proposed complete chat-file envelope. + Private keys and passwords must never be uploaded to the server or placed + in a URL, log, analytics event, crash report, or application browser storage. + + Both participants need access to their own stored conversation. The browser + signs and encrypts each message for both participants. The plaintext payload + binds the conversation, sender, unique message ID, and protocol version. + Display names can travel inside encrypted conversation details. + +STATE AND LIMITS + + No intentional persistent browser chat state: no cookies, localStorage, + sessionStorage, IndexedDB, service workers, analytics, or third-party requests. + Keep keys, passwords, session credentials, and loaded history in memory only. + Serve chat content with Cache-Control: no-store. Reload, close, and leave + require the file and password again. Clear references and zero mutable secret + buffers where possible; JavaScript strings and browser/OS copies are not + reliably erasable. Test page restoration and back/forward navigation. + + The downloaded identity file is the intentional persistent client artifact. + Browsers and operating systems may retain memory, swap, crash dumps, download + records, or restored pages. The application cannot promise literally zero + traces. The current browser probe checks only its own limited test behavior. + + The VPS necessarily retains ciphertext, public-key associations, message IDs, + ordering, counts, and authentication state. Connection addresses, timing, and + ciphertext sizes are visible while serving requests. Avoid retaining these + in application/access logs. Storage and encrypted backups require consistent + database snapshots and a tested recovery procedure before actual chat use. + + The private file is a credential. A lost file/password has no username-based + recovery. A copied unlocked identity enables impersonation and historical + decryption. Rotation can protect future use but cannot undo historical + ciphertext or key copies. Static OpenPGP does not automatically provide + forward secrecy. Compromise of a shared owner key can affect every + conversation encrypted to that key. + + The browser trusts served code, including WASM and generated JavaScript. + A compromised server, dependency, extension, browser, or OS may expose keys + or plaintext. A pinned key does not defeat a malicious application update + or solve first-visit trust. A separate origin limits ordinary cross-origin + access, not shared-host compromise or every cross-site attack. + +LIBREJS AND LICENSING + + First-party code is AGPL-3.0-or-later. Third-party licenses and notices remain + accurate. Required legal comments are the exception to the no-comments rule. + Supply machine-readable JS licensing and corresponding Rust/WASM/JS source. + Test actual LibreJS recognition, generated bindings, workers, and WASM before + displaying GNU LibreJS-compliant. The compatibility harness makes no such + claim and is not a public chat application. + + Intended badge: yellow, GNU LibreJS-compliant, linked to + https://www.gnu.org/software/librejs/ . Hover and keyboard focus explain: + + LibreJS compliance concerns software freedom, not a guarantee of privacy + or security. Review the source code, dependencies, and scripts delivered + to your browser. Server-delivered code can change between visits; free + software can still track users or behave maliciously. + +REMAINING RELIABILITY WORK + + The OpenSSL compatibility experiment is in CHAT-OPENSSL-MIGRATION.txt. + It supersedes the original backend gate, not the remaining application review. + Implement and + test file creation/import, recovery confirmation, signed one-use challenges, + authorization, encrypted sends/replies, replay rejection, N=0 and pagination, + authenticated counters, quotas, rate limits, hostile file and packet limits, + plaintext-only display, session expiry, explicit lock, reload/restoration, + no network leakage, no persistent application storage, and complete backup + restoration. No application is ready merely because its crypto test passes. diff --git a/docs/CHAT-OPENSSL-MIGRATION.txt b/docs/CHAT-OPENSSL-MIGRATION.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17149ac --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/CHAT-OPENSSL-MIGRATION.txt @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +Copyright (C) 2026 Doan Luu Duc Tai <doan@luuduct.ai> + +This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as +published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the +License, or (at your option) any later version. + +This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +GNU Affero General Public License for more details. + +You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License +along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + + +OPENSSL BACKEND MIGRATION RECORD + + Date: 2026-10-30. Branch: feature/private-chat. + Scope: a compatibility and dependency-security experiment, not a messenger. + Main and production are unchanged. No real identity files are created. + +DECISION AND FIXED ALGORITHMS + + Retain Sequoia OpenPGP 2.4.2 and RFC 9980 ML-KEM-1024 + X448 encryption. + Retain ML-DSA-87 + Ed448 signatures, OpenPGP v6 keys, and AES-256 content + encryption. Change the cryptographic backend, not the algorithms or wire + protocol. Probe assertions reject an unexpected backend or key algorithms. + + The previous Rust backend reached cx448 0.1.1 -> crypto-bigint 0.5.5 during + curve arithmetic. It also included rsa 0.9.10. See CHAT-SECURITY-REVIEW.txt + for the original reachability investigation. Neither RustSec issue was + ignored. No mathematical implementation was patched locally. + + The current manifest enables only Sequoia's crypto-openssl feature. The + allow-experimental-crypto and allow-variable-time-crypto opt-ins are gone. + The resolved graph has no cx448, crypto-bigint, or rsa crate. This removes + those Rust backend dependencies; it does not prove that all side channels + are absent from a browser or that external C dependencies have no defects. + +VERSIONS AND SOURCE PROVENANCE + + Rust toolchain: 1.99.1, pinned in rust-toolchain.toml. + Sequoia OpenPGP: 2.4.2, exact requirement and Cargo.lock. + OpenSSL: 3.6.5, native host library and source-built static WASI libraries. + WASI SDK: 34.0 x86_64 Linux, bundled Clang/libclang 23.1.0-wasi-sdk. + Browser test runner: Playwright 1.64.1, Chromium 156.0.8078.4. + + SDK archive: + https://github.com/WebAssembly/wasi-sdk/releases/download/wasi-sdk-34/wasi-sdk-34.0-x86_64-linux.tar.gz + SHA-256 b761e3a0721dbae9c09a0059e5fdb2bf917d1b4a8a7b430fb3b5aafb0984b2c4 + + OpenSSL archive: + https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-3.6.5/openssl-3.6.5.tar.gz + SHA-256 a2157c2830efdec3788939b00c9b0638306d3f0bbb76dc4832ee503bb397df98 + + Digests were checked against upstream GitHub release asset metadata. The + build script verifies each archive before extraction. Hash checking pins + these inputs; it is not a claim that upstream release signatures were + independently verified or that output is bit-for-bit reproducible across + hosts. Archives, SDK, libraries, and build products stay under ignored + .tools/ and target/. The native development library is supplied by the OS. + +WHY WASI + + The original Rust-backend proof used wasm32-unknown-unknown and generated + wasm-bindgen JavaScript. The OpenSSL proof uses a wasm32-wasip1 command + module and a small explicit browser WASI bridge. The Rust command calls + the same compatibility_probe function used by native tests. + + The browser harness loads the new WASI binary directly, not old generated + glue. It requires the output to identify OpenSSL 3.6.5, preventing a stale + Rust-backend artifact from being accepted as evidence of OpenSSL support. + Old browser-build commands are historical and must not be reused here. + +BUILD CONFIGURATION AND BOUNDARIES + + infra/chat/openssl-wasi.conf adds a build target inheriting BASE_unix with + little-endian and 32-bit bignum configuration. It changes configuration, + not OpenSSL's cryptographic source routines. C code is compiled at -O2. + No third-party rand.patch, unconditional entropy-success patch, or custom + random-number generator is applied. A SHA-256 comparison of all 5889 original + regular files against the downloaded OpenSSL archive found no changed or + missing originals after the build; only the separate target configuration + was added. OpenSSL 3.6.5 already supports WASI + getentropy in providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c. + + Configure selects --with-rand-seed=getrandom. WASI libc's entropy request + reaches wasi_snapshot_preview1.random_get. The browser bridge services it + exclusively through crypto.getRandomValues, splitting requests at 65536 + bytes. There is no Math.random, fixed seed, or success-on-failure fallback. + The negative test replaces that API with a failure and requires rejection. + + Build options disable assembly, async operations, automatic config loading, + DSO/modules, POSIX I/O, secure-memory arenas, shared libraries, sockets, + C stdio, thread pools, threads, and interactive console UI. They avoid + unsupported host capabilities and use static libraries. Disabling the + secure-memory arena means ordinary WASM linear memory is used; it does not + establish secure erasure, locked pages, or protection from delivered JS. + Disabling C stdio does not disable the Rust command's captured output. + + _WASI_EMULATED_GETPID and libwasi-emulated-getpid supply the SDK's process-ID + emulation. getuid/geteuid/getgid/getegid map to getpagesize, following the + common WASI port configuration: the browser module has no real OS user IDs + or privilege boundary. These values are not used as randomness or identity + credentials. This is an explicit portability assumption, not a general + POSIX security emulation layer. + + Rust bindings use the SDK's libclang and WASI sysroot with target + wasm32-wasip1 and -fvisibility=default. Without explicit visibility, the + initial bindgen attempt omitted function declarations. Rust's bundled WASI + libc search path precedes the SDK libraries: reversing that order initially + failed to link __wasi_init_tp. The SDK library path remains available for + the emulated-getpid archive. These failures were toolchain integration + issues; no generated cryptographic bindings were manually edited. + +BROWSER CAPABILITIES + + The WASI bridge supplies clocks, browser CSPRNG, empty arguments/environment, + EOF on stdin, and bounded in-memory stdout/stderr for this closed test. + It supplies no real files, preopened directories, sockets, or process launch. + Listed filesystem/network operations return NOTCAPABLE or BADF. Unknown + imports fail before instantiation. Standard output is capped at 65536 chars. + + Those capability denials protect against accidentally connecting the WASI + module to host storage or networking. They do not isolate it from malicious + JavaScript delivered by the same server. Memory, clocks, randomness, and + imported bridge functions remain part of the trusted browser environment. + A test deadline closes Chromium after 120 seconds if execution stalls. + +VERIFICATION + + Native: the same probe passes using OpenSSL 3.6.5. It checks v6 generation, + exact algorithm selection, protected-secret-key serialization/import, + signed UTF-8 encryption to both participants, decryption by each, wrong + password rejection, unexpected signer rejection, and ciphertext tampering. + + Browser: actual Chromium executes the OpenSSL WASI binary and passes the + same checks, then repeats with a fresh module instance. One observed normal + execution requested 1792 bytes across 72 browser CSPRNG calls. These counts + are observations, not cryptographic requirements or entropy estimates. + Removing secure randomness causes failure rather than a successful result. + A modified module requesting an unknown host import is also rejected before + instantiation. These negative tests require the expected failure reason. + + The harness also observes no external requests, cookies, localStorage, + sessionStorage, IndexedDB databases, or service-worker registrations. + Its HTTP responses carry Cache-Control: no-store. This establishes only + this probe's behavior, not that browsers/OSes cannot retain memory, caches, + crash dumps, swap, or restored state. A complete chat session does not exist. + + The native tests, WASI build, and browser test are separate checks. A native + pass cannot stand in for browser execution. A functional pass and a clean + vulnerability scan cannot stand in for a cryptographic or side-channel audit. + +DEPENDENCY POLICY REVIEW + + The RustSec database reports no advisories for the current resolved graph. + No advisory ignore was added. Bans on wildcards, unknown Git/registry sources, + and unreviewed duplicate versions remain enabled. The following existing + upstream API generations cannot be unified merely by cargo update. Duplicate + exceptions match only the exact older version; other versions remain subject + to the duplicate ban. All these packages still undergo advisory and license + checks. Cargo.lock pins both sides of each pair. + + block-buffer 0.10.4 vs 0.12.1 + crypto-common 0.1.7 vs 0.2.2 + digest 0.10.7 vs 0.11.3 + Sequoia's Argon2 0.5.3 -> BLAKE2 0.10 uses the older digest API. + Root SHA-256 and the parser generator's SHA3 use the newer API. + + cpufeatures 0.2.17 vs 0.3.1 + Argon2 uses 0.2; root SHA-256 and parser-generator SHA3 use 0.3. + + generic-array 0.14.7 vs 1.4.5 + Argon2/BLAKE2 digest uses 0.14; SHA1 collision detection uses 1.x. + + getrandom 0.2.17 vs 0.4.3 + Sequoia's unknown-unknown WASM target dependencies declare 0.2; + the root CLI's tempfile uses 0.4. The current browser target is WASI, + whose OpenSSL entropy source is the bridge described above. The + all-target graph is still audited rather than excluding that edge. + + hashbrown 0.15.5 vs 0.17.1 + petgraph uses 0.15 directly and indexmap 2.14 uses 0.17. Both are + brought in by the parser generator at build time. + + itertools 0.13.0 vs 0.15.0 + shlex 1.3.0 vs 2.0.1 + bindgen uses older APIs; lalrpop and cc require the newer ones. + These are build dependencies, not a justification to skip auditing. + + syn 2.0.119 vs 3.0.9 + bindgen/prettyplease and Windows support use syn 2. Root derive + macros and other dependencies use syn 3. Changing that would require + upstream migration or unrelated dependency downgrades. + + The only new license allowance is ISC, scoped to libloading, a bindgen/clang + dependency. GNU-compatible third-party licenses remain correctly attributed. + cargo-about generates notices for the complete workspace. The static OpenSSL + C library and SDK are not Rust crates; their original licenses and sources + must accompany any distributed browser artifact as appropriate. Source + OpenSSL LICENSE.txt is Apache-2.0. Do not treat the Rust notice page alone + as complete documentation of external C/toolchain distribution obligations. + +EXTERNAL LIBRARY MAINTENANCE + + cargo-deny does not audit the externally built OpenSSL C archive or SDK. + Review OpenSSL's release/advisory pages separately and rebuild when needed: + https://openssl-library.org/news/timeline/ + https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities-3.6/ + OpenSSL 3.6.5 is the tested security-patch release dated 2026-09-29. A green + Rust audit is not a lifetime security guarantee for this pinned C version. + Choose and document a supported update policy before production deployment. + +REPRODUCE FROM THE STACK ROOT + + Native prerequisites: OpenSSL >=3.5 development headers/library, libclang, + pkg-config, and the pinned Rust toolchain. For the cross build also provide + a Linux x86_64 build host, Perl, make, curl, tar, and sha256sum. No root-owned + packages or system settings are changed by the cross-build script. + + cargo test --locked -p stack-chat-crypto + cargo run --locked -p stack-chat-crypto + sh infra/chat/build-openssl-wasi.sh + npm install --prefix .tools/browser --save-exact playwright@1.64.1 + PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH="$PWD/.tools/browsers" .tools/browser/node_modules/.bin/playwright install chromium + PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH="$PWD/.tools/browsers" node crates/chat-crypto/tests/browser.mjs + cargo stack check + + The build script pins archive versions and hashes, configures static OpenSSL, + installs it under .tools/openssl-wasi, builds the Rust WASI command, and prints + its SHA-256. It does not download/use an unverified precompiled OpenSSL binary. + It may reuse already extracted sources; use a fresh ignored tools/build tree + when independently verifying the source archive rather than trusting a + previously modified extraction. Downloads and test artifacts are not secrets. + + Build logs and complete dependency trees are local ignored diagnostics in + .tools/chat-openssl-*.log and .tools/chat-openssl-duplicates.txt. The native + result and the browser result must explicitly identify the OpenSSL backend. + +REMAINING WORK + + Observed WASI artifact SHA-256 on this development machine: + 7fba6b96377619ef41f056d4027c4409107372e9300b2dd69be865e72892df79 + This is a diagnostic identifier, not a cross-host reproducibility promise. + + This removes the specific Rust-backend dependency blocker and demonstrates + the fixed algorithms in a browser. It is not a complete messaging service, + audit of OpenSSL/WASI/JIT timing behavior, LibreJS certification, or proof + against malicious delivery. The file format, authentication, server/database, + quotas, hostile-input handling, pagination/counts, backup recovery, complete + session lifecycle, and browser-state tests still need implementation. diff --git a/docs/CHAT-SECURITY-REVIEW.txt b/docs/CHAT-SECURITY-REVIEW.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4567322 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/CHAT-SECURITY-REVIEW.txt @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +Copyright (C) 2026 Doan Luu Duc Tai <doan@luuduct.ai> + +This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as +published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the +License, or (at your option) any later version. + +This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +GNU Affero General Public License for more details. + +You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License +along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + + +CHAT CRYPTOGRAPHY SECURITY REVIEW + + Date: 2026-10-30. Historical review of the initial Rust backend. + The current OpenSSL migration is recorded in CHAT-OPENSSL-MIGRATION.txt. + Private-message use and production deployment are still not ready. + Branch: feature/private-chat. Production and main remain unchanged. + +FIXED REQUIREMENT + + Encryption must remain RFC 9980 ML-KEM-1024 + X448 using v6 keys. + The compatibility probe pairs it with ML-DSA-87 + Ed448 signatures. + No fallback encryption profile is implemented or approved. + The findings below apply to checkpoint 436e217, before the backend change. + +TEST RESULTS + + Sequoia OpenPGP 2.4.2 with its Rust backend generated password-protected v6 + secret keys, serialized and reimported them, signed UTF-8 content, encrypted + to both participants, and decrypted successfully for both participants. + Wrong passwords, unexpected signers, and modified ciphertext were rejected. + The same probe passed in actual Chromium using Rust compiled to WASM. + + Functional tests are not a cryptographic audit, constant-time analysis, + conformance certification, or demonstration that side channels are absent. + The test uses no user-supplied key files and does not provide chat service. + +RUSTSEC-2026-0387: REACHABLE DEPENDENCY + + Sequoia 2.4.2's crypto-rust backend selects cx448 0.1.1 for both X448 + and Ed448. cx448 depends on crypto-bigint 0.5.5. + + Source paths within these exact published crates: + + sequoia-openpgp/src/crypto/backend/rust/asymmetric.rs + x448_generate_key, x448_derive_public, x448_shared_point + ed448_generate_key, ed448_sign + cx448/src/x448.rs + PublicKey::from(&Secret), Secret::as_diffie_hellman + cx448/src/curve/montgomery.rs + Montgomery scalar multiplication and projective-to-affine conversion + cx448/src/field.rs + elliptic_curve::bigint and constant-modulus Montgomery representation + cx448/src/field/element.rs + field subtraction, multiplication, inversion + cx448/src/field/scalar.rs + scalar arithmetic using crypto-bigint integer operations + + The flagged crate is part of the required curve arithmetic. It cannot be + dismissed as an unused RSA dependency. The advisory covers timing variation + in arithmetic intended to be constant-time and identifies >=0.7.6 as fixed. + cx448 0.1.1 requires the incompatible 0.5 series. Updating Cargo.lock alone + cannot satisfy that requirement with 0.7.6. Source changes or another backend + would require a separate review and tests; no local cryptographic patch has + been invented to bypass this gate. + + This establishes a reachable affected dependency and prevents a claim of + unreachability. It does not prove practical key extraction from this WASM + binary on a particular browser/CPU. No such exploit has been demonstrated. + The hybrid construction's independent component may preserve protection + under some component failures; that is not grounds for ignoring the audit. + + Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0387.html + +RUSTSEC-2023-0071: RSA + + Sequoia's crypto-rust feature also includes rsa 0.9.10. The probe generates + only the specified PQ identities and calls their corresponding primitives; + it does not generate an RSA key or exercise RSA private-key operations. + + That observation applies only to this closed, generated-input probe. It is + not proof that a future importer, certificate verifier, authentication + endpoint, or decryption interface cannot be induced to use another algorithm. + The future application needs an explicit supported-algorithm policy and + hostile-input tests before any narrower exception could be assessed. + + Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071.html + +BACKEND CHECK + + In the installed Sequoia 2.4.2 source, the Nettle and Botan asymmetric + backends report these required composite algorithms unsupported. The OpenSSL + backend conditionally supports them, depending on the available OpenSSL + version/features. Its browser/WASM build has not been demonstrated here. + Native OpenSSL support alone would not satisfy client-side browser encryption. + + The Rust backend requires allow-experimental-crypto and + allow-variable-time-crypto. These are explicit prototype build opt-ins, + not security approvals or claims that the selected operations are safe. + +OTHER AUDIT GATES + + The new dependency graph also contains multiple crate versions. Its exact + graph is pinned in Cargo.lock. Duplicate bans have not been relaxed, and + no vulnerability advisory has been ignored. License permissions for Sequoia + and its dependencies must remain correctly attributed in generated notices. + + The project check must audit the whole workspace. A root-package-only + cargo-deny invocation misses a workspace member that is not a dependency + of the root CLI. The branch changes that invocation to --workspace. + +NEXT GATE + + Retain the fixed algorithms. Resolve the curve-backend dependency through + a reviewed upstream-compatible fix or demonstrate an acceptable alternative + backend in the browser. Repeat the native and browser tests, review imported + hostile inputs, and pass the full dependency audit before private-message use. diff --git a/docs/POLICY.txt b/docs/POLICY.txt index 592269b..4c8d0bd 100644 --- a/docs/POLICY.txt +++ b/docs/POLICY.txt @@ -48,8 +48,10 @@ STRICTNESS or broad warning suppression is introduced. cargo-deny rejects duplicate crate versions, wildcard requirements, unknown - registries, unknown Git sources, and yanked versions. There are no duplicate - version skip exceptions. Its AGPL allowance is scoped to this package. + registries, unknown Git sources, and yanked versions. The chat prototype has + exact-version duplicate exceptions reviewed in CHAT-OPENSSL-MIGRATION.txt. + No RustSec advisories are ignored. First-party AGPL and required dependency + license allowances are scoped to their individual packages. The dependency allowlist retains the requested permissive licenses and Zlib; an unused allowance may produce an informational audit warning. @@ -73,3 +75,7 @@ PORTABILITY rejects mismatched production images. Development mode may fetch/build native images on an architecture mismatch. Container source and Rust source are public so new targets can be added without restoring an OS. + + Generated third-party legal texts retain upstream whitespace and line endings. + .gitattributes exempts only THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES.html from whitespace errors; + first-party source checks remain strict. Workspace audits include every member. |